By Reda Kohen, lawyer admitted to the Paris Bar
The query wind farm is being searched in the United States. Trend data collected on November 19, 2026 placed it among active business and finance searches, in a reported volume bucket of 10,000 or more, with a reported rise of 700 percent, starting at 1:00 a.m. UTC the same day. Related searches include a definitional question and offshore wind farm, alongside local place names. This note does not describe a casualty, a cancellation, a pause, or any other event dated to that search spike. No official document read for this note establishes such an event. The method that follows is general. It applies to a commercial offshore wind lease on the Outer Continental Shelf, not to a private onshore easement, a state tidelands grant, or a lease of Indian land.
The practical question is what the federal paper actually conveys before any turbine is built. A lease issued under the renewable-energy regulations grants a right to occupy a designated portion of the outer Continental Shelf and to install and operate facilities, but only subject to the approvals the regulations require. A construction and operations plan must still be approved before approved activities on the lease may begin. Neighboring users who oppose a project have asked federal courts to set aside the biological opinion, the incidental harassment authorization, and the plan approval. In 2024 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the agencies in three separate appeals. Those holdings bind that circuit. They are not, standing alone, the judgment of another circuit. This is information on United States law. The author is admitted in Paris and does not claim admission, or a right to practice, in the United States.
I. What does a federal offshore wind lease allow before construction?
A. The statute, the twelve conditions, and the right the lease actually grants
Offshore wind on the outer Continental Shelf is a federal property question before it is an energy question. The statute that matters is section 1337 of title 43 of the United States Code, in the 2023 edition published by the Government Publishing Office. Subsection (p) is headed as leases, easements, or rights-of-way for energy and related purposes. Paragraph (1) says the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating and other relevant departments and agencies, may grant a lease, easement, or right-of-way on the outer Continental Shelf for activities not otherwise authorized in that subchapter, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, or other applicable law, if those activities meet one of the listed purposes. The purpose that covers wind is in subparagraph (C): activities that produce or support production, transportation, storage, or transmission of energy from sources other than oil and gas. The same paragraph also covers certain oil and gas support uses, transportation of oil or gas excluding shipping, reuse of existing facilities, and carbon dioxide injection. A reader who has an oil and gas lease in the same area cannot treat a wind lease as a silent amendment of that oil and gas lease. They are different grants, under different clauses, even though they sit in one section.
The grant is not a blank check. Paragraph (4) of the same subsection requires the Secretary to ensure that any activity under the subsection is carried out in a manner that provides for twelve listed matters. They are safety; protection of the environment; prevention of waste; conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf; coordination with relevant federal agencies; protection of national security interests of the United States; protection of correlative rights in the outer Continental Shelf; a fair return to the United States; prevention of interference with reasonable uses, as determined by the Secretary, of the exclusive economic zone, the high seas, and the territorial seas; consideration of the location and any schedule of the grant and of any other use of the sea or seabed, including a fishery, a sealane, a potential deepwater port, or navigation; public notice and comment on any proposal; and oversight, inspection, research, monitoring, and enforcement. Paragraph (5) requires the Secretary to provide for duration, issuance, transfer, renewal, suspension, and cancellation. Paragraph (6) requires a surety bond or other security, such other requirements as the Secretary considers necessary to protect the public and the United States, and restoration of the lease, easement, or right-of-way. Paragraph (7) requires coordination and consultation with the Governor of any affected State or the executive of any affected local government. A coastal business that cares about a cable route, a fishing ground, or a navigation lane is looking at clauses (I) and (J), not at a general promise of community benefit. The statute assigns the reasonable-use determination to the Secretary. It does not give a private neighbor a veto written into paragraph (4).
The operating regulations are in part 585 of title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as displayed on the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations. The pages read for this note state that title 30 was displayed as up to date as of November 17, 2026, and that title 30 was last amended on November 12, 2026. Those pages also state that the electronic code is authoritative but unofficial, and that it is not an official legal edition of the Code of Federal Regulations. The lease section cites section 1337 of title 43 as its authority. The source note on the subpart C page read here is 89 Federal Register 42729, May 15, 2024, unless otherwise noted. The source note on the subpart G page is 89 Federal Register 42748, May 15, 2024, unless otherwise noted. This note uses the regulatory sentences actually displayed on those pages. It does not reconstruct a preamble that was not read.
Section 585.200 asks what rights are granted with a lease issued under that part. Subsection (a) states that a lease grants the lessee the right, subject to obtaining the necessary approvals, including but not limited to those required under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hydrokinetic licensing process, and complying with all provisions of the part, to occupy, and install and operate facilities on, a designated portion of the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of conducting commercial activities, or other limited activities that support, result from, or relate to the production of energy from a renewable energy source. Two limits are already in that sentence. The right is subject to obtaining the necessary approvals. The geography is a designated portion of the outer Continental Shelf, not the upland, not state waters, and not every acre a developer later wishes to use for a substation on shore. Subsection (b) confers a right to one or more project easements without further competition, for gathering, transmission, and distribution cables, pipelines, and appurtenances on the outer Continental Shelf as necessary for the full enjoyment of the lease. The lessee must apply for that project easement as part of the construction and operations plan or the general activities plan, and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management incorporates an approved project easement in the lease as an addendum. A cable right on the outer Continental Shelf is therefore not a surprise addition invented in a press release. It is a regulated easement, and it is not in force as an approved addendum until that approval step occurs. Subsection (c) states that a commercial lease issued under the part may be developed in phases, with Bureau approval as provided in section 585.238. This note does not restate section 585.238, because that section was not read. A reader who is told that a project will be built in phases should read that section and the approval, not assume that a phased schedule is self-executing.
For a business comparing this instrument with an ordinary real property right, the useful comparison is the difference between a right to occupy and a permit to build. The federal lease is closer to the first. The approvals are the second. Readers who work through similar questions of what a recorded right actually conveys, including from outside the United States, can set that comparison beside the real estate law treatment of long-term rights in land. The comparison does not import French property law onto the outer Continental Shelf. It only marks why the first document to read is the grant, not the turbine count in a headline.
B. Why the lease sale is not the construction approval
The First Circuit put the sequence in one place on December 5, 2024. In Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. v. United States Department of the Interior, No. 23-1853 and No. 23-2051, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said that the Bureau’s issuance of a lease does not itself authorize development of the site, citing section 585.200(a). To proceed to development, the court said, a lessee must formulate a site assessment plan, obtain approval of that plan, and then obtain approval of a construction and operations plan. The court added that no construction may begin until that plan is approved, citing the regulatory provisions it listed, including section 585.620. The opinion on CourtListener carries no reporter citation. The identity used here is the one printed in the opinion: the parties, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, docket numbers 23-1853 and 23-2051, and the date December 5, 2024. The court affirmed the judgments of the district court.
The regulation read today is consistent with that sequence, and it is slightly more precise than a paraphrase about construction alone. Section 585.620 defines the construction and operations plan as the document that describes construction, operations, and conceptual decommissioning plans under the commercial lease, including the project easement. Subsection (a) requires the plan to describe all planned facilities that will be constructed and used, including onshore and support facilities and all anticipated project easements. Subsection (b) requires a description of all proposed activities, including proposed construction activities, commercial operations, and conceptual decommissioning plans for all planned facilities, including onshore and support facilities. Subsection (c) of section 585.620 states the operative bar in the text displayed on November 17, 2026: “You must receive BOEM approval of your COP before you can begin any of the approved activities on your lease.” The bar is not limited to driving the first pile. It covers any of the approved activities on the lease. A reader who is told that survey work, cable lay, or foundation installation is “just preparatory” should test that sentence against the approval, not against the brochure.
The same section also limits what a neighbor can learn from the plan alone. The Bureau will withhold trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential from public disclosure under exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, in accordance with section 585.114. This note does not restate section 585.114, which was not read. The point that is in the section that was read is narrower: a public copy of a plan may be incomplete on cost and commercial terms. A challenge, or a business decision, that depends on a redacted figure has to identify the redaction rather than treat the public PDF as the whole file.
Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. and the other plaintiffs were entities involved in or associated with the commercial fishing industry. They sued federal departments, agencies, and officials, and the business entity that submitted the plan, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on thirty-nine claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and several environmental statutes. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in multiple respects. The court of appeals affirmed. The opinion describes the facility as located on the outer Continental Shelf, some fourteen miles south of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket, and states that the facility began delivering power to the New England grid in early 2024. Those are facts stated in the December 5, 2024 opinion. They are not a report of any event after that date, and they are not a finding about any other wind farm.
The same opinion is useful for a question that search traffic often smuggles in: what happens if something changes after the approval. The court said it had received letters under Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure alerting it to recent developments that had caused federal regulators to pause the project. It held that those incidents, occurring after the challenged agency decisions, were not relevant to the arguments in the appeals. It quoted an earlier case for the principle that the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court. This note did not separately read that earlier case. The holding that is in the opinion read here is the one that matters for a later reader: a pause announced after the decisions under review does not, by itself, rewrite the record on which those decisions are judged. Conversely, a pause is not erased by an older affirmance. A person who needs the legal effect of a later pause has to read the later order. It was not an official document read for this note, and this note does not describe it.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act discussion in that opinion also shows how a fishing or navigation objection is framed. The court said the statute authorizes the Department of the Interior, acting through the Bureau, to grant leases on the outer Continental Shelf for renewable wind energy production, citing section 1337(p)(1)(C) and a regulatory section, 30 C.F.R. section 585.100, that this note did not separately read. When granting such leases, the court said, the Bureau must ensure that any activity is carried out in a manner that provides for the statutory criteria, including prevention of interference with reasonable uses and consideration of fishing and navigation, citing section 1337(p)(4) and 30 C.F.R. section 585.102(a). Section 585.102 was not separately read here. The statutory list in paragraph (4), which was read, is the list set out above. The plaintiffs in the appeal argued, among other things, about navigation and about whether the plan satisfied those criteria. The court affirmed. A later reader should not convert that affirmance into a rule that navigation impacts are irrelevant. The court decided the record before it. A different spacing of turbines, a different transit lane, or a different circuit is a different record.
II. What can a coastal user still challenge, and on what record?
A. The biological opinion, the harassment authorization, and the standard of review
Two statutes sit on top of the lease before pile driving starts, and the First Circuit decided both of them, a day apart, in April 2024, in appeals about the same offshore project.
The Endangered Species Act duty is in section 1536 of title 16, again in the 2023 edition. Paragraph (a)(2) requires each federal agency, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, to insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by that agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species, or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless an exemption has been granted by the Committee under subsection (h). In fulfilling that paragraph, each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data available. The statute does not say that any harassment is forbidden. It states a jeopardy duty, a critical-habitat duty, and a best-available-data duty. A comment letter that disagrees with a model is not, by itself, proof that the duty was missed.
On April 24, 2024, in Nantucket Residents Against Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 100 F.4th 1, docket number 23-1501, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided that duty on the record of this project. The court held that the agencies followed the law and that their analyses rationally support the no-jeopardy conclusion, and it affirmed the judgment of the district court. Judge Kayatta wrote for a panel that also included Judge Lynch and Judge Gelpí. The appeal was from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Judge Indira Talwani. The plaintiffs were Nantucket Residents Against Turbines and Vallorie Oliver. The defendants included the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, and Vineyard Wind 1, LLC. The court described the claim in these terms: after consulting with the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Bureau approved construction of the project, and the residents alleged that the agencies violated the Endangered Species Act by concluding that construction likely would not jeopardize the North Atlantic right whale, and that the Bureau violated the National Environmental Policy Act by relying on that analysis.
The court disagreed. It held that the Service and the Bureau followed the law in analyzing the right whale’s current status and environmental baseline, the likely effects of the project on the right whale, and the efficacy of measures to mitigate those effects. It held that the agencies’ analyses rationally support their conclusion that Vineyard Wind will not likely jeopardize the continued existence of the right whale. It affirmed the judgment of the district court. Later in the opinion, the court rejected the National Environmental Policy Act theory as well. It said it could not conclude that the Bureau’s reliance on the Service’s biological opinion violated that statute, because the biological opinion was not defective and the Bureau had not blindly relied on it. Those are holdings about this record. They are not a certificate that every future biological opinion for every wind farm is lawful. They do tell a coastal user what will not work: a brief that restates a preferred reading of the science, without showing that the agency failed the statutory duty or that the record does not rationally support the finding.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act authorization is a different instrument, and it is easy to confuse with the biological opinion. Section 1371(a)(5)(D)(i) of title 16, in the 2023 edition, addresses citizens of the United States who engage in a specified activity, other than commercial fishing, within a specific geographic region. Upon request, the Secretary shall authorize, for periods of not more than one year, subject to such conditions as the Secretary may specify, the incidental, but not intentional, taking by harassment of small numbers of marine mammals of a species or population stock by those citizens while engaging in that activity within that region, if the Secretary finds that such harassment during each period will have a negligible impact on such species or stock, and will not have an unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of the species or stock for subsistence taking under the provisions the statute lists. The words that do the work are specific, not general. The activity must be specified. The region must be specific. The taking must be incidental and not intentional. The numbers must be small. The period must not be more than one year. The findings are negligible impact, and no unmitigable adverse impact on subsistence availability. An authorization that is silent on the period, or that a reader treats as a permanent permit, is not what this subsection describes.
On April 25, 2024, in Melone v. Coit, 100 F.4th 21, docket number 23-1736, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided a challenge to an incidental harassment authorization issued to Vineyard Wind 1, LLC. The court found that challenge to be without merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Judge Kayatta again wrote, for a panel with Judge Lynch and Judge Gelpí, on an appeal from Judge Talwani in the District of Massachusetts. Thomas Melone was the appellant. Janet Coit was sued in her official capacity as Assistant Administrator of the National Marine Fisheries Service, together with the Service and Vineyard Wind 1, LLC. The court described the case as one of two appeals in which residents of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket opposed the project, and said the common assertion was that federal agencies failed to follow the law, or good science as viewed by the residents, in assessing the possible impact on the endangered North Atlantic right whale. It noted that the decision issued the day before, in the Nantucket Residents appeal, had rejected a challenge to the biological opinion. This case, the court said, considered the challenge to the incidental harassment authorization, the receipt of which was also necessary to construct the project. The court found the challenge to be without merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
The geographic-region fight is the part a later challenger is most likely to repeat. The court agreed with the agency that the area in question was precisely where the pile-driving activities, and therefore the incidental harassment, would occur, and that the area shared similar biological characteristics. It found the overarching concern — that a narrow delineation of the specific geographic region threatened to ignore the project’s broader effect on the right whale population — unwarranted on this record. It found that the agency’s delineation of the specific geographic region was proper. The court also declined to apply the Chevron doctrine. It said that because it found no need to defer to any agency interpretation of any statute or regulation, it had no reason to consider whether and how that doctrine might otherwise apply. A 2026 reader should not cite this opinion as a Supreme Court decision about Chevron. It is a First Circuit decision that did not need deference to decide the authorization in front of it.
Later citation treatment of Melone v. Coit is real, and it is easy to over-read. A search of the government index for decisions citing 100 F.4th 21 returned, among other documents, a memorandum and order of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in National Parks Conservation Association v. United States Department of the Interior, Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-10877-AK. The order, filed June 12, 2026, as document 41, was entered by Judge Angel Kelley on the plaintiffs’ motion for a stay under section 705 of title 5, or in the alternative a preliminary injunction. The dispute is about national park interpretive materials, not about a wind lease. The court cited Melone v. Coit, 100 F.4th 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2024), for the arbitrary-and-capricious formulation: an agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. That is a use of the standard of review. It is not a second wind-farm judgment, and it is not a holding that every disagreement with a turbine layout meets that formulation. The search that returned the order is not a complete citator. It does show that, as of the documents returned in this passage, a 2026 district court in the same circuit was still using the April 25, 2024 opinion for the review standard.
The December 5, 2024 opinion in Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. is the recent citing decision for the April 24 biological-opinion case. In the text read on CourtListener, the court cited Nantucket Residents Against Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 100 F.4th 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2024), for the National Environmental Policy Act description it was applying, and cited the same opinion at page 8 in its discussion of the Endangered Species Act’s territorial reach. The citation is an application inside another wind-plan appeal, not a reversal. The court in the later appeal affirmed as well. A reader who finds only the April opinions and stops has missed that, five months later, the same court again left the plan approval in place on the record before it, including against fishing-industry plaintiffs who put navigation and statutory-criteria arguments in front of the panel.
B. What the record will support, and the checks that remain open
The review standard that ties these appeals together is section 706 of title 5, in the 2023 edition. The reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. It shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, and hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or to fall into the other categories the section lists, including action in excess of statutory jurisdiction and action without observance of procedure required by law. In making those determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The last clause is the one a neighboring business most often skips. A procedural misstep that did not prejudice the outcome is not, under the text of section 706, an automatic order tearing up the lease. The First Circuit opinions read here applied that framework to the records before them and affirmed. They did not publish a checklist of errors that are always prejudicial.
National Environmental Policy Act exposure has to be stated from the statute that is in force in the edition read here, not from a memory of an older environmental-impact sentence. Section 4332 of title 42, in the 2023 edition, requires, consistent with the chapter and except where compliance would be inconsistent with other statutory requirements, that every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment include a detailed statement by the responsible official on a listed set of subjects. The subjects in the text read here include reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of the proposed agency action; any reasonably foreseeable adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the proposal is implemented; and a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed agency action, including an analysis of any negative environmental impacts of not implementing the proposed agency action in the case of a no-action alternative, that are technically and economically feasible and meet the purpose and need of the proposal. The April 2024 and December 2024 opinions describe the statute in the words those opinions use, including quotations of section 4332. Where an opinion’s quotation and the 2023 statutory text are not identical, the quotation is what the court wrote, and the statutory text is what the edition says. A filing in 2026 that copies only a pre-amendment sentence, and never addresses reasonably foreseeable effects and the no-action alternative as the edition states them, is aiming at the wrong target. This note does not decide whether the 2023 amendments change the outcome of a plan approved before those amendments. That question is not answered by the pages read here. What is answered is that a current reader of the code cannot pretend the detailed-statement list still ends where an older casebook ended.
The checks that remain, for a coastal business, a port operator, a fishery, or a landowner at a cable landing, are documentary. They are not a prediction about any named project.
First, identify the water and the land. If the turbines would stand on the outer Continental Shelf, the lease grant is the federal instrument under section 1337(p) and part 585. If the turbines would stand on private upland, on state trust land, or on Indian land, the three First Circuit opinions do not supply the lease form. Using them as if they did is a category error. The federal project easement described in section 585.200(b) is an easement on the outer Continental Shelf. It is not a deed to a beach, a parking lot, or a substation site on shore. Onshore facilities still have to be described in the construction and operations plan under section 585.620(a). Description in a federal plan is not a state zoning approval and not a private easement from the upland owner. Those instruments, if they exist, are separate documents. This note does not state the zoning law of any State, because no state zoning code was read.
Second, read the lease and the plan approval as two documents. Section 585.200(a) grants the right to occupy and to install and operate facilities subject to obtaining the necessary approvals. Section 585.620(c) forbids beginning any of the approved activities on the lease before the Bureau approves the construction and operations plan. A lease-sale notice, a bid confirmation, or a press mention of a winning bidder does not satisfy that sentence. The approval, if it exists, will say what activities are approved and on what conditions. Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. records that the approval in the case before the court was subject to terms and conditions. A reader of a different project has to find that project’s terms. They are not implied from the affirmance.
Third, separate the wildlife instruments. The biological opinion is the consultation document under section 1536. The incidental harassment authorization is the one-year instrument under section 1371(a)(5)(D), if that is the provision the agency used. The April 24, 2024 opinion rejected the jeopardy and National Environmental Policy Act challenges on the biological opinion in that record. The April 25, 2024 opinion rejected the challenge to the harassment authorization, including the geographic-region delineation, on that record. An authorization issued for not more than one year does not, under the statutory text, cover a later year. Whether a later year was in fact authorized is a question about a later document. If that document is not in the file, the statute does not fill the gap with an automatic renewal.
Fourth, match the objection to the standard in section 706. A disagreement with the agency’s weighing of whale presence, pile-driving noise, or a transit lane is the kind of disagreement the April 2024 opinions rejected when the record rationally supported the agencies. An objection that the agency failed to consider a matter the statute required it to ensure, under section 1337(p)(4), or that it acted without the procedure the statute requires, is a different objection, and it still has to be proved from the record, with prejudicial error accounted for. The December 5, 2024 opinion is a warning about timing as well as about merits. Developments after the decision under review, including a later pause described to the court in Rule 28(j) letters, were held not relevant to the review of the earlier decisions. A person who wants a court to look at a later pause has to challenge the later action, on the later record. This note does not describe any such later action, because no official document of a later pause was read.
Fifth, do not export these holdings past the First Circuit without a decision from the circuit that would hear the case. The opinions name the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the District of Massachusetts as the trial court, and waters south of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket. A project offshore another State may be governed by another court of appeals. The statutory text in titles 43, 16, 42, and 5 is national. The affirmances are not. The June 12, 2026 district court order shows a later use of Melone v. Coit for the review standard inside the First Circuit’s geographic area. It does not nationalize the wind holdings.
Nothing in the pages read here states a limitations period, a tolling rule, or a special accrual rule for a wind-lease challenge. A general judicial-review period is not invented by analogy in this note. If a filing deadline controls a particular petition, it has to come from a statute or a rule read for that petition. It is not supplied by the affirmance dates of April 24, April 25, or December 5, 2024.
Conclusion
A search for wind farm in the United States does not, by itself, identify a project, a casualty, or a change in the law. On the outer Continental Shelf, the federal commercial lease grants a right to occupy a designated area and to install and operate renewable-energy facilities, subject to the approvals the regulations require. It does not authorize development by the mere fact of issuance. Approved activities on the lease wait for approval of the construction and operations plan, which must describe the facilities, including onshore and support facilities, and the project easement. The statute still requires the Secretary to ensure safety, environmental protection, a fair return, and consideration of fishing, sealanes, and navigation, among the other matters in the twelve-part list. Those duties are enforced through review of the record, not through a private veto written into the lease section.
The First Circuit, in April and December 2024, affirmed agency approvals on the records before it, including the biological opinion, the incidental harassment authorization, and the plan approval. A 2026 district court order in a different dispute used one of those opinions for the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. None of those decisions is a national building permit, a permanent wildlife authorization, or a deed to the upland where a cable comes ashore. The documents that answer a particular site are the lease, the plan approval and its conditions, the biological opinion, and any harassment authorization still in force, read against the statutes and the review standard above.