By Reda Kohen, lawyer admitted to the Paris Bar
The search term tasty chick n llc is trending in the United States. On November 16, 2026, Tasty Chick’n, LLC filed a voluntary petition under chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the case carries number 26-90831. Rider 1 to that petition lists three affiliates that filed the same day, VRE Tasty 7 Pack, LLC, Tasty Chick’n Southeast, LLC and Tasty Chick’n Midwest, LLC, and states that the debtors moved for joint administration under the case number of Tasty Chick’n, LLC. The petition’s list of the 30 largest unsecured claims describes most of them as vendor claims and five of them as landlord claims. As of November 18, 2026, this is a pending Chapter 11 case at its opening stage: the court docket reproduced by CourtListener lists first-day motions filed on November 16, 2026 and orders signed on November 17, 2026. The petition and the first-day filings contain the debtors’ own statements, not findings by the court.
This article gives general information on U.S. federal bankruptcy law for the two groups that usually have the most immediate questions when a business files under Chapter 11: the landlords of its premises and the suppliers of its goods. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about Tasty Chick’n’s situation. Each lease, invoice and supply contract still has to be read on its own terms.
I. What changes for a landlord or a supplier on the day of the filing?
A. The automatic stay stops collection, and sometimes requires action
Under federal law, the filing of a petition operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of a list of acts set out in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The list covers the commencement or continuation of a judicial, administrative or other proceeding against the debtor to recover a claim that arose before the case began, any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate, any act to collect, assess or recover a claim that arose before the case, and the setoff of a prepetition debt owed to the debtor against a claim against the debtor. For a landlord, that means no new eviction suit, lockout or default procedure aimed at rent owed for the period before the petition without first going to the bankruptcy court. For a supplier, it means no collection letter, lawsuit or unilateral setoff on invoices for goods delivered before the filing.
The stay is not permanent and it is not absolute. Section 362(d) directs the court, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, to grant relief from the stay for cause, and the statute names the lack of adequate protection of the party’s interest in property as one example of cause. A landlord or a supplier that believes it needs to act should therefore file a motion and obtain an order. The order of operations matters: the Bankruptcy Code gives the creditor a route to the court, not a right to act first and argue afterwards.
The Supreme Court of the United States clarified the reach of the words “exercise control” in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. 154 (2021), decided on January 14, 2021. Each owner had filed a bankruptcy petition and asked the city to return a vehicle impounded for unpaid fines, and the city had refused. The Court held that the mere retention of estate property after the filing of a petition does not violate § 362(a)(3), because that provision is best read to prohibit affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property as it stood when the petition was filed. The Court pointed to a separate provision of the Code, § 542, as the one that governs turnover of estate property. For a landlord or supplier, the practical line is between holding what it already held on the petition date and taking a new step after that date. Changing the locks on leased premises, removing equipment from a restaurant or taking back goods that are in the debtor’s possession are new steps of the kind the stay addresses. A dispute over property the creditor already held when the case began raises a different question, which the court decides under the turnover rules.
That line does not mean that doing nothing is always safe. In Myers v. Plumeria Accord Holdings, LLC, Adversary Proceeding 26-05030, the United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Georgia, on September 30, 2026, cited Fulton, 592 U.S. 154, for the statement that omissions can qualify as acts in certain contexts. Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court found it plausible, on the facts as alleged, that a creditor’s failure to respond to the debtor’s requests to stop the execution of a pending state-court warrant could amount to a stay violation, and it denied the motion. A creditor that started a court process before the petition should therefore work out what it must do to halt that process once it learns of the filing, rather than simply waiting for the process to run its course. Garnishments, pending motions and scheduled hearings in state court are the usual places to look.
Two further points help in practice. First, the stay protects the debtor and property of the estate; it does not, by itself, settle whether a given asset belongs to the estate, and that question can be disputed before the bankruptcy court. Second, a creditor that is unsure whether a planned step would violate the stay can ask the court for relief or for a ruling before taking it. Both points favor documented requests over self-help, especially in the first days of a case when first-day motions are being heard and the court is setting the framework for the case.
B. Clauses that end a lease or contract because of the filing
Many commercial leases and supply agreements state that the tenant’s or customer’s bankruptcy, insolvency or financial condition is an event of default that allows termination. Federal law limits the effect of those clauses once the case has begun. Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1), an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and no right or obligation under it may be terminated or modified, after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under the Code, or on the appointment of a trustee or custodian. A landlord or supplier that relies on such a clause to end the relationship after the filing is relying on a term that the statute sets aside.
The same section contains limits on what the debtor can do. Section 365(c)(1) bars the debtor from assuming or assigning a contract, absent the counterparty’s consent, where applicable law excuses the counterparty from accepting performance from, or rendering performance to, an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession. Section 365(c)(3) bars assumption or assignment of a lease of nonresidential real property that was terminated under applicable nonbankruptcy law before the order for relief. Whether a particular franchise, license, lease or supply agreement falls within one of these provisions depends on the type of contract, the law that governs it and the history of the relationship, so a counterparty should not draw a conclusion from the title of the document. A counterparty that sent a termination notice before the petition should assemble the notice, the cure periods, the dates of delivery and any later correspondence, because the timing of a termination can decide whether the contract or lease is still part of the case.
The central decision for counterparties is what the debtor does with each contract that both sides still have to perform. Section 365(a) allows the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, to assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. In most Chapter 11 cases the debtor itself administers the estate as debtor in possession, so the choice is made by the company under the supervision of the court. Assumption means the debtor keeps the contract and performs it going forward, after dealing with past defaults as § 365(b) requires. Rejection means the debtor stops performing.
The Supreme Court of the United States explained the consequences of rejection in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370 (2019), decided on May 20, 2019. The Court held that under Section 365, “a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract in bankruptcy has the same effect as a breach outside bankruptcy.” Rejection lets the debtor stop performing, but it does not rescind rights that the contract had already granted to the other side. The counterparty is left with a claim for damages that § 365(g) treats as arising immediately before the date of the petition, which places that claim alongside the claims of unsecured creditors. A supplier or landlord should therefore value two different outcomes for each contract: full performance plus a cure of past defaults if the contract is assumed, or a prepetition damages claim if it is rejected. The difference between those two figures is usually what the negotiation over a contract is really about.
Courts continue to apply that reasoning to other kinds of contracts. In In re Boy Scouts of America, Nos. 23-1664 et al., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in an opinion filed on May 13, 2025, relied on Tempnology, 587 U.S. 370, for the principle that the estate “cannot possess anything more than the debtor itself did outside bankruptcy.” Applying that principle to insurance policies, the court reasoned that a debtor may not sell estate property with greater or fewer rights or obligations than it held outside bankruptcy, apart from exceptions in the Code that were not at issue in that case. For a counterparty, the corresponding check is whether a proposed sale order or plan would change the terms of its contract beyond what the Code itself allows, and whether to raise that point before the hearing rather than after it.
In the case described in the introduction, the docket lists a motion filed by Tasty Chick’n, LLC on November 16, 2026 for an order approving procedures to reject or assume executory contracts and unexpired leases and to abandon certain personal property. The entries read for this article show the motion; the procedures that will apply are those set out in whatever order the court enters. In comparable cases, a counterparty should read any procedures order line by line for the form of notice it will receive, the deadline to object, the person to whom an objection must be sent and the way a disagreement over amounts is to be resolved. A missed objection deadline can be harder to repair than a weak argument.
II. How can landlords and suppliers protect what they are owed?
A. Suppliers: goods delivered just before the filing, deliveries after it, and the proof of claim
A supplier’s first task is to sort its open invoices by the date on which the debtor received the goods, not by the invoice date. The reason is 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9), which allows as an administrative expense the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date the case commenced, where the goods were sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business. Administrative expenses have priority over most unsecured claims, as the Houston bankruptcy court discussed below also notes, so the portion of a supplier’s claim that fits within this window can be worth considerably more than the rest. The provision refers to goods; it does not mention services, so a supplier that provides both should separate the two in its records. Delivery receipts, bills of lading and the debtor’s own receiving records are the evidence that usually decides when goods were received.
A second federal tool is reclamation. Under 11 U.S.C. § 546(c), a seller that sold goods to the debtor in the ordinary course of the seller’s business may reclaim goods that the debtor received while insolvent within 45 days before the commencement of the case. The right is subject to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in the goods or their proceeds, which can matter in a case where lenders hold liens on inventory. The seller must make a written demand for reclamation not later than 45 days after the debtor received the goods or, if that 45-day period expires after the case began, not later than 20 days after the commencement of the case. If the seller does not give notice in that manner, § 546(c)(2) provides that it may still assert its rights under § 503(b)(9). For perishable food supplies, reclamation may be of limited practical use because the goods are consumed quickly, but the written demand costs little and the statutory window is short.
Deliveries made after the filing are treated differently again. Section 503(b)(1)(A) allows as administrative expenses “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate,” and, as the decision discussed next explains, courts in the Fifth Circuit ask whether a claim arose after the petition as a result of actions taken by the debtor in possession that benefited the estate. A supplier that agrees to keep delivering during the case is therefore in a different position from one that is only owed money for past deliveries, provided that it can prove what it delivered after the petition, at what price and with what benefit to the estate.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, the court in which the case described above is pending, applied that provision in In re Barrow Shaver Resources Co., No. 24-33353 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2026), a memorandum opinion entered on August 24, 2026. A non-debtor party to joint operating and exploration agreements asked for administrative priority for amounts the debtor had withheld after the petition but before it rejected those agreements. The court noted that rejection is a breach treated as occurring immediately before the petition, but it held that the production revenues the debtor had withheld during the months before the rejection, together with certain disputed tax-preparation costs, qualified as administrative expenses, because the debtor had kept receiving the benefit of the agreements while it continued to operate under them. Other advance payments, for which the party relied on alternative theories, did not receive that priority and were left to a claim for damages. A supplier that keeps delivering after a filing should keep each postpetition delivery, order and payment in a separate record, so that it can show the benefit the estate received before any rejection. The opinion decided a dispute between the parties before that court; elsewhere it shows how a bankruptcy judge in Houston approached the question, without binding other courts.
The next document to watch is the claims process. In a Chapter 11 case, 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) provides that a proof of claim is deemed filed for any claim that appears in the debtor’s schedules, except a claim scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated. A supplier should therefore check how its claim is listed once the schedules are filed, and file its own proof of claim if the claim is missing, listed in the wrong amount or flagged as disputed, contingent or unliquidated. In the case described in the introduction, the docket lists a motion filed on November 16, 2026 asking the court to set bar dates for filing proofs of claim, and an order signed on November 17, 2026 extending the time to file schedules of assets and liabilities and statements of financial affairs. The deadline that matters will be the one fixed by the court’s order once it is entered, and the notice of that deadline should be kept with the supplier’s invoices.
Suppliers also have a voice in the case. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), a party in interest, including a creditor, “may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.” In practice, that right is exercised through written objections and appearances at hearings on matters such as financing, the payment of particular prepetition claims, sales of assets and the treatment of contracts. Suppliers based outside the United States usually face a second set of questions about the law governing their contracts, the currency of their claims and enforcement in their home country. Those French and European questions are distinct from the U.S. case and fall within the work of the firm’s business law attorneys in Paris, while the U.S. proceeding itself is governed by the federal rules described here.
B. Landlords: rent after the filing, the 120-day decision and the cap on lease damages
For a landlord of commercial premises, the most immediate federal rule concerns rent that falls due after the petition. Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3), the trustee, which in most Chapter 11 cases means the debtor in possession, must timely perform all the obligations of the debtor arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until that lease is assumed or rejected, with the exception of certain obligations listed in § 365(b)(2). The court may extend, for cause, the time to perform an obligation that arises within 60 days after the order for relief, but not beyond that 60-day period. The same paragraph states that the landlord’s acceptance of performance does not waive its rights under the lease or under the Code. For a voluntary case, 11 U.S.C. § 301(b) provides that the commencement of the case constitutes the order for relief, so the count starts with the petition.
The second rule sets the time the debtor has to decide. Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)(A), an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee is deemed rejected, and the trustee must immediately surrender the property to the lessor, if the lease is not assumed or rejected by the earlier of 120 days after the order for relief or the date of an order confirming a plan. Under § 365(d)(4)(B), the court may extend that period once, before the 120-day period expires, for 90 days on the motion of the trustee or the lessor for cause; any later extension requires the prior written consent of the lessor in each instance. A landlord should calendar the 120-day date from the petition, watch for an extension motion before it, and recognize that its written consent becomes decisive for any further extension.
When the debtor decides to keep a lease, it must deal with the past. Section 365(b)(1) provides that, if there has been a default, the trustee may not assume the lease unless, at the time of assumption, it cures the default or provides adequate assurance that it will promptly cure it, compensates or provides adequate assurance of prompt compensation for pecuniary loss resulting from the default, and provides adequate assurance of future performance. When the debtor wants to transfer a lease, § 365(f) allows assignment notwithstanding a clause that prohibits or restricts it, but only if the lease is first assumed and adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee is provided. Section 365(b)(3) adds specific adequate-assurance criteria for leases in shopping centers. A landlord’s best preparation is an accurate ledger of unpaid prepetition amounts, unpaid postpetition amounts and other charges under the lease, because the cure figure will be argued from that ledger.
Lease assignments often take place through a sale of the debtor’s assets under § 363, and the appeal rules for those sales are strict. Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), the reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of the sale or lease to an entity that purchased or leased the property in good faith, unless the authorization and the sale or lease were stayed pending appeal. In MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288 (2023), decided on April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court of the United States held that § 363(m) is not a jurisdictional provision; that case began when a shopping-center landlord objected to the assignment of a lease that a buyer had acquired the right to designate in a retailer’s Chapter 11 sale. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose decisions bind the federal courts in Texas, applied MOAC in Matter of Fieldwood Energy LLC, No. 23-20104 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024), decided on February 20, 2024. It found no narrowing of § 363(m) other than the clarification that a party can lose the benefit of its terms, and it rejected the argument that asking for a stay was enough: “The relevant question, though, is whether a stay was obtained.” A landlord or other counterparty that wants to challenge a sale order on appeal should ask for a stay pending appeal and treat the ruling on that request, not the request itself, as decisive. The objection to the assignment, the evidence on adequate assurance and the stay request all belong in the bankruptcy court before the sale closes.
If a lease is rejected, the landlord’s damages claim is capped. Under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6), a lessor’s claim for damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property is not allowed to the extent it exceeds the rent reserved by the lease, without acceleration, for the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of the lease, following the earlier of the date of the petition and the date on which the lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the property, plus any unpaid rent due under the lease, without acceleration, on the earlier of those dates. As an illustration on a simple reading of that text, a lease with ten years left would be measured by 15 percent of ten years, or eighteen months of rent, because that exceeds one year; a lease with four years left would be measured by one year of rent, because 15 percent of four years is less than a year; and a lease with thirty years left would stop at three years. The calculation for an actual lease should be checked against its rent clauses and the decisions of the court where the case is pending.
These rules give a landlord three distinct amounts to track: rent and charges that were unpaid on the petition date, obligations arising after the petition that § 365(d)(3) requires the debtor to perform until it decides, and, if the lease is rejected, damages subject to the cap in § 502(b)(6). Keeping them apart in correspondence and in any proof of claim avoids confusion over which amount enjoys which treatment. A landlord whose premises are part of a group of locations should also check whether its lease is held by the entity that filed or by another company in the group, because only leases of a debtor are subject to these rules.
Conclusion
When a commercial tenant or customer files a reorganization case under the federal Bankruptcy Code, federal law changes the order in which landlords and suppliers act. Collection stops at the petition, and a creditor that needs to take a step against the debtor or its property asks the court first. A creditor that set a court process in motion before the filing should check whether it must take steps to halt it. Clauses that end a contract because of the filing do not operate on their own after the case begins, and the debtor decides, under court supervision, which contracts and leases it keeps and which it rejects.
The money owed then falls into separate categories with different treatment: goods received in the 20 days before the filing, deliveries and rent after the filing, prepetition invoices and arrears, and damages if a lease or contract is rejected. Each category depends on dates and documents that the creditor holds or can obtain: delivery receipts, ledgers, notices, the schedules and the court’s orders on claims, contracts and any sale. Statements in first-day filings remain a debtor’s statements until the court rules on them, and the deadlines that matter most are those fixed by the statute and by the orders the court actually enters.
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