Every month, your French subsidiary wires several thousand euros to its foreign parent company for management fees, strategic support, shared IT tools or the right to use the group brand. The invoices look clean, the group has always done it this way, and the amounts are deducted from the French taxable profit. Then a letter arrives from the SIE (service des imp\u00f4ts des entreprises, the local corporate tax office): your company will undergo a v\u00e9rification de comptabilit\u00e9, the on-site audit of its books. Eighteen months later, the inspector concludes that those management fees were excessive, partly fictitious or simply a way to shift profit out of France, and reassesses your subsidiary for several years of corporate tax (IS, imp\u00f4t sur les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s), withholding tax and penalties. This scenario is one of the most frequent and most expensive disputes foreign groups face in France, and three recent rulings of the Conseil d’\u00c9tat (France’s supreme administrative court) in the Ferragamo, Elie Saab and Menarini cases show exactly how inspectors build it and how companies can defeat it. This guide explains, in plain business English, why French inspectors attack intra-group fees, what the courts actually require from each side, and the concrete file your group should assemble from day one to prove the fees, price them correctly and contest a reassessment within the deadlines.<\/p>\n
The attack always follows the same legal route, and understanding that route is the key to defending yourself. The inspector does not need to prove fraud or bad faith. A single article of the French Tax Code, Article 57 of the CGI (Code g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des imp\u00f4ts), gives the administration a presumption: once it shows that your French company depends on a foreign group company and that money moved on non-arm’s-length terms, the transfer is presumed abusive and your subsidiary must prove the opposite. Everything in this first part describes that mechanism and the three court decisions that define its limits today.<\/p>\n
Article 57 applies to any French business that is dependent on, or controls, companies located outside France. Its opening words, which every reassessment notice quotes, state: “Pour l’\u00e9tablissement de l’imp\u00f4t sur le revenu d\u00fb par les entreprises qui sont sous la d\u00e9pendance ou qui poss\u00e8dent le contr\u00f4le d’entreprises situ\u00e9es hors de France, les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices indirectement transf\u00e9r\u00e9s \u00e0 ces derni\u00e8res, soit par voie de majoration ou de diminution des prix d’achat ou de vente, soit par tout autre moyen, sont incorpor\u00e9s aux r\u00e9sultats accus\u00e9s par les comptabilit\u00e9s.” In other words, profits indirectly shifted abroad, whether by inflating or cutting purchase or sale prices or by any other means, are added back to the French taxable result. The provision applies to corporate tax through Article 209 of the same code, which taxes companies on profits earned by businesses operated in France: “en tenant compte uniquement des b\u00e9n\u00e9fices r\u00e9alis\u00e9s dans les entreprises exploit\u00e9es en France”. The full official texts are published here: Article 57 of the CGI on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a> and Article 209 of the CGI on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. For background on the standard 25 percent corporate rate now at stake in every reassessment, see Article 219 of the CGI on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>: “Le taux normal de l’imp\u00f4t est fix\u00e9 \u00e0 25 %.” Our general guide to that tax landscape is here: French Corporate Tax for Foreign Owners: IS at 25 percent, Branch vs Subsidiary, and Paying on Time<\/a>.<\/p>\n In practice, the inspector must establish two things, and only two. First, a link of dependence: your French SAS (soci\u00e9t\u00e9 par actions simplifi\u00e9e, the flexible limited company most foreign founders choose) or SARL (soci\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 responsabilit\u00e9 limit\u00e9e, the traditional limited company) is wholly or majority owned by the foreign parent, shares directors with it, or follows its instructions. In a classic parent-subsidiary structure, this first step takes the inspector one paragraph. Second, a practice falling within Article 57: an advantage granted to the foreign company that an independent business would not have granted. The Conseil d’\u00c9tat formulates the consequence in settled terms, repeated word for word in the Ferragamo ruling of 23 November 2020: “Ces dispositions instituent, d\u00e8s lors que l’administration \u00e9tablit l’existence d’un lien de d\u00e9pendance et d’une pratique entrant dans les pr\u00e9visions de l’article 57 du code g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des imp\u00f4ts, une pr\u00e9somption de transfert indirect de b\u00e9n\u00e9fices qui ne peut utilement \u00eatre combattue par l’entreprise imposable en France que si celle-ci apporte la preuve que les avantages qu’elle a consentis ont \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9s par l’obtention de contreparties.” The decision is published here: Conseil d’\u00c9tat, 23 November 2020, n\u00b0 425577 (Ferragamo France) on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. Once dependence and a suspicious practice are shown, the burden flips entirely: your subsidiary must prove it received genuine consideration in return.<\/p>\n What counts as a suspicious practice covers almost every form of intra-group billing a foreign group uses. Overpriced services are the classic case: the French subsidiary pays its parent far more for consulting, HR support or IT than an independent provider would charge. Underpriced revenue is the mirror image: the subsidiary sells to the parent below market price. Un-rebilled expenses are the third family: the French company bears costs that legally or economically belong to the parent, such as global advertising, fashion shows or product development, without recharging them. The Elie Saab ruling of 17 June 2021 gives the textbook definition: “Constitue une telle pratique la prise en charge par une entreprise \u00e9tablie en France de d\u00e9penses incombant \u00e0 sa soci\u00e9t\u00e9 m\u00e8re \u00e9tablie hors de France, notamment en ce qu’elles contribuent au d\u00e9veloppement de la valeur d’une marque appartenant \u00e0 celle-ci.” The full decision is here: Conseil d’\u00c9tat, 17 June 2021, n\u00b0 433985 (Elie Saab France) on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. And the Ferragamo ruling adds a fourth pattern foreign distributors should know: insufficient remuneration, where the French company incurs heavy prestige costs that build the value of a brand owned by its foreign parent without being paid enough in return: “Peut constituer une telle pratique l’insuffisante r\u00e9mun\u00e9ration per\u00e7ue par une entreprise \u00e9tablie en France qui expose des charges contribuant au d\u00e9veloppement de la valeur d’une marque appartenant \u00e0 sa soci\u00e9t\u00e9 m\u00e8re \u00e9tablie hors de France.” (Conseil d’\u00c9tat, 23 November 2020, n\u00b0 425577, Ferragamo France<\/a>).<\/p>\n Two factual signals systematically trigger the inspector’s suspicion, and foreign groups should audit themselves on both before any audit begins. The first is chronic losses at the French subsidiary while the group prospers: a company that loses money year after year yet keeps paying generous fees to its profitable parent looks, to any inspector, like a profit pump running in reverse. In Ferragamo, the French distributor had been continuously loss-making from 1996 to 2009; in Elie Saab, the French company had been largely loss-making since its first financial year closed in 2002; in Menarini, the operating losses had recurred since the company’s creation in 2003. Losses do not prove anything by themselves, and the Conseil d’\u00c9tat censured reasoning based on losses alone, but recurrent deficits combined with rising intra-group charges will always draw the inspector’s attention. The second signal is a margin that collapses exactly where the intra-group invoices land: gross margin per product line falling, service costs climbing, or a royalty plus fees stack that leaves the French company with crumbs. If your French accounts show either signal, treat the next audit as a transfer-pricing audit and prepare the file described in Part II now, not when the inspector walks in.<\/p>\n The Ferragamo case is the clearest illustration of the insufficient-margin attack. Ferragamo France, then wholly owned through a Dutch holding by the Italian fashion house Salvatore Ferragamo SpA, distributed the group’s luxury products in France almost exclusively. After an audit of the 2009 and 2010 years, the inspector compared its wage bill and external costs, driven by highly qualified sales staff and prestigious Paris retail premises, with nineteen independent distributors of luxury goods selected under OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) transfer-pricing principles. The French company’s costs were markedly higher, and the extra gross margin it earned, notably through a 25 percent purchasing discount granted by the Italian company, did not fully offset the extra charges. Combined with continuous losses from 1996 to 2009, the inspector treated the margin shortfall as an advantage granted to the Italian company and added it back to the French taxable profit, with corporate tax, withholding tax and local business-tax consequences. The tribunal administratif de Paris (the first-instance administrative court) and then the CAA (cour administrative d’appel, the administrative court of appeal) of Paris sided with the company, but the Conseil d’\u00c9tat quashed the appeal ruling: the appeal judges had been wrong to hold that no advantage existed merely because the company turned profitable from 2010 to 2015 without changing its transfer-pricing policy, while themselves noting that the extra wage and rental costs aimed to grow, on a strategic luxury market, the value of an Italian brand that did not yet enjoy the fame of its direct competitors. The lesson for distributors is direct: if your French company spends prestige money that builds a foreign-owned brand, the extra margin the group leaves you must demonstrably cover that spend, or the inspector will price the gap as a hidden profit shift.<\/p>\n The Elie Saab case shows the second classic pattern, the un-rebilled brand expense, and it ended in a total victory for the administration that every group should study. Elie Saab France, 99.99 percent owned by the Lebanese parent Elie Saab Group, ran ready-to-wear lines, distributed accessories worldwide, operated a Paris boutique with a haute-couture salon, and organised the brand’s fashion shows while paying for communication and promotional campaigns. The inspector found that the French company bore costs benefiting the whole group rather than its own business and added back the un-recharged promotion and show expenses, a 5 percent margin on the expenses that had been recharged at cost, and press-office staff costs. The company argued that those expenses also served its own activity as the group’s profit centre for accessories and head of the daytime couture line, and pointed to expenses the Lebanese parent had itself borne without recharge, such as support services, a Fashion TV contract, the pay of the parent’s co-managers and the designer’s salary, plus the absence of any brand royalty invoiced by the parent. The Conseil d’\u00c9tat rejected every argument: the appeal court had sufficiently established that the French company bore expenses incumbent on its foreign parent, and the company had not proved consideration capable of rebutting the presumption, since neither the parent’s own un-recharged spending nor its failure to charge a brand royalty counted as a counterparty benefit to the French subsidiary. Two practical rules emerge. First, keep the two directions of money strictly separate: the fact that your parent also spends money for the group does not offset what your subsidiary spends for the parent unless a clear agreement prices each flow. Second, the absence of a brand royalty cuts both ways: it does not prove the parent gave you something in return, and inspectors increasingly ask why a subsidiary using a world-famous brand for free simultaneously pays heavy service fees to the brand owner.<\/p>\n The Menarini case, decided on 7 May 2025, is the most recent word and it contains both a warning and a weapon for taxpayers. A. Menarini Diagnostics France, wholly owned through Menarini France by Italian group companies, bought and resold diagnostic devices and products. Audited for 2011 to 2013, it faced two adjustments: one based on recurrent operating losses since 2003 despite the intrinsic profitability of its activities, and one based on allegedly overpriced purchases of the G-IHCO product range from an Italian sister company, measured by the comparable-uncontrolled-price method using a single internal comparable, the G-ECCH range the French company bought from an independent supplier. The Conseil d’\u00c9tat restated the presumption rule once more: “Ces dispositions instituent, d\u00e8s lors que l’administration \u00e9tablit l’existence d’un lien de d\u00e9pendance et d’une pratique entrant dans leurs pr\u00e9visions, une pr\u00e9somption de transfert indirect de b\u00e9n\u00e9fices qui ne peut utilement \u00eatre combattue par l’entreprise imposable en France que si celle-ci apporte la preuve que les avantages qu’elle a consentis ont \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9s par l’obtention de contreparties.” Then it split the case in two. On the loss-based adjustment, it quashed the appeal ruling, confirming that recurrent deficits alone cannot carry an Article 57 adjustment without a properly characterised advantage. On the pricing adjustment, it upheld the administration: the two product ranges addressed the same customers in the same sector, no other internal comparable existed, and the G-IHCO sales represented a sufficiently representative share, so “la cour a jug\u00e9 que l’administration fiscale avait pu en l’esp\u00e8ce, sans en alt\u00e9rer la fiabilit\u00e9, appliquer la m\u00e9thode du prix comparable en retenant cet unique comparable interne.” The decision is published here: Conseil d’\u00c9tat, 7 May 2025, n\u00b0 491058 (Menarini Diagnostics France) on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. The message is balanced: challenge loss-based reasoning aggressively, because the highest court polices it, but expect the courts to accept pragmatic comparables, including a single internal one, when your own files offer the administration nothing better.<\/p>\n A reassessment never stops at corporate tax, and foreign owners consistently underestimate the pile-up. The added-back amounts are taxed at the standard rate, currently 25 percent under Article 219. Then the administration routinely treats the same sums as distributed income deemed paid to the foreign parent, triggering the withholding tax (retenue \u00e0 la source) on outbound distributions provided by Article 119 bis of the CGI, whose second paragraph submits the products listed in Articles 108 to 117 bis to withholding when they benefit persons without French tax domicile: the official text is here: Article 119 bis of the CGI on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. If your treaty with the parent’s country caps that levy, the excess can be reclaimed from abroad under the procedure described in our companion guide: Taking Profits Out of Your French Company as a Foreign Owner: Dividends, Withholding Tax and the Treaty Refund<\/a>. Where the parent sits in a low-tax jurisdiction, Article 238 A of the CGI can go further and deny the deduction of the service payments outright: “Les int\u00e9r\u00eats, arr\u00e9rages et autres produits des obligations, cr\u00e9ances, d\u00e9p\u00f4ts et cautionnements, les redevances de cession ou concession de licences d’exploitation, de brevets d’invention, de marques de fabrique, proc\u00e9d\u00e9s ou formules de fabrication et autres droits analogues ou les r\u00e9mun\u00e9rations de services, pay\u00e9s ou dus par une personne physique ou morale domicili\u00e9e ou \u00e9tablie en France \u00e0 des personnes physiques ou morales qui sont domicili\u00e9es ou \u00e9tablies dans un Etat \u00e9tranger ou un territoire situ\u00e9 hors de France et y sont soumises \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime fiscal privil\u00e9gi\u00e9, ne sont admis comme charges d\u00e9ductibles” except under strict proof conditions set out in the rest of the article, published here: Article 238 A of the CGI on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. Interest on arrears and penalties for bad faith or abuse of law can then multiply the bill. The rational response is therefore not to hope the inspector looks elsewhere, but to build, before any audit, the proof file that wins under the exact rules these three rulings apply.<\/p>\n Winning a management-fees dispute is decided long before the courtroom, in the quality of the paper your group produces during the audit and in the speed of its procedural reactions afterwards. The inspector works from your own accounts, contracts and emails; the judges review what the file contained at each stage. This second part gives you the checklist the file must satisfy and the ladder of remedies that leads, if needed, from the audit meeting to the Conseil d’\u00c9tat, following the exact path the Ferragamo, Elie Saab and Menarini companies walked from the tribunal administratif through the CAA to the supreme court.<\/p>\n Start with the reality of the services, because fictitious or duplicate billing is where files die fastest. For every euro of management fees, your subsidiary must show that a service was actually rendered, that it was useful to the French company’s own business, and that it was not already paid for elsewhere. Concretely, the inspector will ask for the written intra-group services agreement with its pricing schedule, the detailed invoices describing each mission rather than a flat monthly line, timesheets or activity reports naming the people who worked and the hours spent, deliverables such as studies, reports, software releases or recruitment files, and the email trail showing the French team requesting and using the work. A one-page annual invoice for strategic coordination with no supporting document is, in audit practice, already half a reassessment. Mirror the discipline on the French side: board or shareholder minutes approving the agreement, evidence that the French management actually received and applied the deliverables, and proof that no local employee or external provider was paid twice for the same task. Groups that score well here are groups where the French subsidiary behaves like a demanding client, commissioning, receiving and criticising the parent’s work, not a mailbox that pays whatever invoice arrives from headquarters.<\/p>\n Continue with the price, because real services billed at an unreal price are reassessed just as surely. France follows the arm’s-length principle shared across the OECD area: related companies must deal with each other as independent businesses would. Your file should therefore contain a transfer-pricing analysis proportionate to the amounts at stake: the method chosen among the recognised approaches such as comparable uncontrolled prices, cost-plus with a documented margin, or the transactional net-margin method, an explanation of why that method fits the service, and a benchmark built from independent comparables with the search criteria, the rejected candidates and the resulting range. The Menarini ruling shows why this homework matters: when the taxpayer’s file offers no reliable alternative, the courts let the administration price with the comparables it can find, including a single internal one. Keep the analysis consistent with the group’s worldwide transfer-pricing master file and with the country-by-country reporting where the group falls within its scope, since contradictions between the French file and the group’s global story are an inspector’s favourite exhibit. The tax administration’s official transfer-pricing guide, published on impots.gouv.fr (the portal of the French tax administration), is the natural starting point for structuring that documentation: Guide des prix de transfert on impots.gouv.fr<\/a>. Update the benchmark regularly; a 2019 study defending 2024 invoices invites the reply that the market has moved.<\/p>\n Secure the company-law side of the payments, because tax inspectors read board minutes too. When the French company is an SAS with a single shareholder, the service agreement between the subsidiary and its foreign parent, which controls it, must be recorded in the register of decisions. When the SAS has several shareholders, Article L227-10 of the Code de commerce (the French Commercial Code) requires a report on agreements signed directly or through intermediaries between the company and its president, its managers, any shareholder holding more than 10 percent of the voting rights or, where that shareholder is itself a company, the company controlling it: “Le commissaire aux comptes ou, s’il n’en a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9sign\u00e9, le pr\u00e9sident de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sente aux associ\u00e9s un rapport sur les conventions intervenues directement ou par personne interpos\u00e9e entre la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 et son pr\u00e9sident, l’un de ses dirigeants, l’un de ses actionnaires disposant d’une fraction des droits de vote sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 10 % ou, s’il s’agit d’une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 actionnaire, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 la contr\u00f4lant au sens de l’article L. 233-3.” The shareholders then vote on that report; unapproved agreements still bind the company but the interested party bears any resulting damage. The official text is here: Article L227-10 of the Code de commerce on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. In a SARL, the mirror rule is Article L223-19: the manager, or the statutory auditor (commissaire aux comptes) where one exists, presents a report on agreements between the company and any of its managers or shareholders, the meeting votes on it, and the interested manager or shareholder may not vote: “Le g\u00e9rant ou, s’il en existe un, le commissaire aux comptes, pr\u00e9sente \u00e0 l’assembl\u00e9e ou joint aux documents communiqu\u00e9s aux associ\u00e9s en cas de consultation \u00e9crite, un rapport sur les conventions intervenues directement ou par personnes interpos\u00e9es entre la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 et l’un de ses g\u00e9rants ou associ\u00e9s.” The official text is here: Article L223-19 of the Code de commerce on L\u00e9gifrance<\/a>. Missing approvals do not create the tax adjustment by themselves, but an inspector who finds unapproved, undocumented related-party agreements has already formed an opinion about the seriousness of the file, and judges notice the same gaps.<\/p>\n Close the file with contemporaneous tax evidence the inspector cannot ignore. Keep the French transfer-pricing documentation finished when the tax return is filed, not reconstructed two years later during the audit; backdate-looking files carry little weight with either the inspector or the court. Reconcile the management-fees total with the statutory accounts (the annual financial statements filed with the greffe, the clerk’s office of the commercial court) and with the corporate tax return line by line, so no unexplained gap invites questions. Where the parent is established in a jurisdiction with a privileged tax regime, prepare the additional proof Article 238 A demands that the payments correspond to real transactions at arm’s length, because the deduction itself is at stake from the first euro. Centralise everything in one audit-ready binder, physical or digital, with an index the inspector can follow without your help: agreement, invoices, timesheets, deliverables, benchmark study, board approvals, accounting reconciliation. An inspector who can verify the story alone in an afternoon closes fewer adjustments than one who must chase each document for months, and the same binder becomes, unchanged, your evidence before the courts.<\/p>\n The audit follows a contradictory procedure, and each stage is a chance to narrow or kill the adjustment before it becomes a final tax bill. During the v\u00e9rification de comptabilit\u00e9, the inspector must discuss findings with you before concluding; answer every factual point in writing, supply the missing proof immediately, and never let an inaccurate statement in the audit minutes stand uncorrected, because judges later treat those minutes as the agreed factual record. When the formal rectification proposal (proposition de rectification) arrives, detailing each legal basis and amount, the clock starts: you have a short statutory period to reply with observations, supported by the documents and the benchmark study. This reply is the single most important letter of the whole dispute. It freezes your legal arguments, it forces the inspector to answer them point by point, and everything you omit here must later be rebuilt at greater cost before the courts. Have it drafted or reviewed by counsel experienced in transfer-pricing litigation, attach every exhibit the file binder contains, and request the hierarchical remedies the procedure offers: a meeting with the inspector’s superior and, for transfer-pricing matters, the specialised national commission that gives an independent opinion on the pricing method. Inspectors settle or reduce many adjustments at this stage when the file is strong; they pursue the rest knowing exactly which points the taxpayer left weak.<\/p>\n If the adjustment is maintained, the dispute moves to formal remedies, where speed and completeness matter equally. First, use the rapid amicable channels: the departmental tax conciliator (conciliateur fiscal d\u00e9partemental), who undertakes to answer within 30 days to inform you of the decision or the processing status for complex files, and then the mediator of the finance ministries for persistent disputes about the administration’s conduct, once the conciliator or the corporate tax office has been approached. The official English-language guidance of the French administration describes that ladder, including ex gratia appeals, settlements (transactions) and mediation, here: Tax disputes: amicable remedies for companies, on Service-Public.fr in English<\/a>. Note one caution from that same guidance: once a settlement covering the duties and penalties is signed and executed, the company can no longer challenge those amounts before a judge, so never sign a transaction to buy time unless you genuinely accept its terms. Second, file the formal administrative claim (r\u00e9clamation) against the tax notice within the statutory time limit running from the assessment, attaching the full evidence set again; the administration’s express or implied rejection opens the door to court. Third, bring the case before the tribunal administratif of the place of taxation, which re-examines facts and law in full, with appeal to the CAA and, on points of law, a pourvoi to the Conseil d’\u00c9tat, exactly the route travelled in Ferragamo, Elie Saab and Menarini. Throughout, manage cash: a reassessed company can generally request deferred payment while the claim is pending, but conditions and guarantees apply, so align the litigation calendar with treasury planning and inform the foreign parent early, since French collection measures can reach the subsidiary’s bank accounts fast.<\/p>\n Three recurring mistakes destroy otherwise winnable cases, and each has a simple antidote. The first is answering the inspector orally and late: undocumented explanations given months after the facts carry no weight against a reasoned adjustment, while dated contracts, timesheets and emails do. The second is changing the pricing story between stages: the method defended in the audit reply, the conciliator’s file, the claim and the court briefs must remain identical, because any shift reads as an admission that the original price was indefensible. The third is letting the foreign parent ignore the dispute: the French subsidiary bears the burden of proof, yet the decisive evidence, cost records of the services rendered, group benchmark data, parent-side time records, sits abroad. Put the parent under a written litigation-support duty as soon as the audit opens, with named contacts and deadlines, so the French team never has to tell the inspector that the proof exists but cannot be produced. Groups that treat a French audit of management fees as a group-level project, with the parent’s finance and legal teams engaged from the first letter, settle better and litigate stronger than groups that leave the local accountant to face the inspector alone.<\/p>\n Management fees between a French subsidiary and its foreign parent are legitimate, but French law watches them through the demanding lens of Article 57: once dependence and a suspicious practice are shown, your company must prove genuine services and an arm’s-length price, or the amounts come back into French taxable profit with withholding tax on top. The Ferragamo, Elie Saab and Menarini rulings draw the battle lines clearly. Prestige spending that builds a foreign-owned brand must be covered by the margin the group leaves in France; costs borne for the parent must be recharged with a real margin rather than absorbed; recurrent losses invite scrutiny but cannot alone sustain an adjustment; and courts accept pragmatic pricing methods when the taxpayer’s own file offers nothing better. Build the proof before the audit, price with a fresh benchmark, secure the shareholder approvals, answer the rectification proposal as if it were already a court brief, and climb the remedy ladder without missing a step. Handled that way, an inspector’s challenge to your management fees becomes a technical discussion your group can win, not a multi-year bill it must endure.<\/p>\n Our firm advises foreign groups and overseas parents on French transfer-pricing audits, management-fees disputes and cross-border reassessments every week. You receive a telephone consultation within 48 hours with a lawyer of the firm, with a clear answer on your audit risk, your pricing file and your chances in a dispute. Call +33 6 46 60 58 22<\/a> or write through our contact page<\/a>, and keep your intra-group agreements, fee invoices and the inspector’s latest letter at hand for the call.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Your French subsidiary pays management fees to its foreign parent and the tax inspector wants to add them back. Article 57, the Ferragamo, Elie Saab and Menarini rulings, and the proof file that wins.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":251031309,"featured_media":16273,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kj_source_type":"","_kj_official_id":"","_kj_official_url":"","_kj_judilibre_id":"","_kj_jur":"","_kj_lieu":"","_kj_chambre":"","_kj_rg":"","_kj_date":"","activitypub_content_warning":"","activitypub_content_visibility":"","activitypub_max_image_attachments":4,"activitypub_interaction_policy_quote":"anyone","activitypub_status":"federated","footnotes":""},"categories":[80314,80313],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2118409","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-decryptage","category-doing-business-in-france"],"yoast_head":"\nB. What the Ferragamo, Elie Saab and Menarini rulings teach foreign groups<\/h3>\n
II. How your foreign group proves, documents and contests a management fees reassessment<\/h2>\n
A. What proof and paperwork the inspector expects from the first meeting<\/h3>\n
B. How to contest the reassessment step by step without missing a deadline<\/h3>\n
Conclusion<\/h2>\n
Need a quick opinion on your case.<\/h2>\n